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W hat major challenges have journalists and mediaorganizations faced since 1997? How have themedia responded to and sometimes shaped po-
litical changes in Hong Kong? What is the status of press
freedom in the city? This article discusses these questions
by analyzing the interplay among the national, the interna-
tional, and the local. We argue that re-nationalization, inter-
nationalization, and localization are the three primary
processes of social and political development in post-han-
dover Hong Kong, and that the interplay among these forces
has shaped the transformation of the Hong Kong media and
their relationship with politics. The following discussion be-
gins with the explication of each of these three processes
and how they impinge on the media. We then discuss how
the three processes are intertwined.  Re-national ization:  Recogniz-ing  the  New Power  Center
By re-nationalization, we refer to the process of the political,
economic, and cultural reintegration between Hong Kong
and China over the past twenty years. This process can be
traced back to 1984 when the Sino-British Joint Declaration
sparked off a series of societal and political changes. Most
importantly, a dual power structure was instantiated in Hong
Kong in the transition period. Within the structure, the bal-
ance of power gradually shifted from the United Kingdom to
the People’s Republic of China as time went on. The British
colonial government had to consult the Chinese government
and even seek its approval on important political and admin-
istrative policies in Hong Kong. At the same time, the Chi-
nese government began to co-opt local elites to facilitate the
smooth transfer of power. Many local elites were invited to
participate in the drafting of the Basic Law and/or later to
participate in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion (HKSAR) Preparatory Committee. Some were even
invited to become members of the Chinese People’s Politi-
cal Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and National Peo-
ple’s Congress. 
Many of the appointed local elites were media owners. For
example, Louis Cha was a member of the Basic Law Draft-
ing Committee in the 1980s, at which time he was also the
owner of Ming Pao((2). This practice of political appointment
as a form of co-optation has continued since 1997. Sally Aw
was appointed a member of the CPPCC in 1998, at which
time she was the owner of the Sing Tao Group. Ma Ching
Kwan of Oriental Daily and Yang Lan of Sing Pao Daily
were both appointed in 2003. Other media tycoons who
have received political appointments include Peter Woo
(Cable TV), Ricky Wong (HK Broadband), Charles Ho
(Sing Tao), and Chan Wing Ki (Asia Television Ltd.). 
It is widely assumed that the central government is interested
in silencing oppositional voices in Hong Kong. However,
Hong Kong has been through numerous ups and downs in the ten years since the handover. The media have also
undergone significant changes in relation to the larger social and political reconfigurations. While the press, driven
by market forces and professional ideologies, has continued to provide timely information to the public and to
monitor the behavior of power holders, the power center has employed various means to tame the media, and self-
censorship remains a haunting issue.
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given the promises of “one country, two systems” and a
“high degree of autonomy,” overt forms of control and sup-
pression are likely to backfire. Hence, co-optation remains
the primary means by which the central government exerts
political influence. In other words, political and economic re-
wards are given to members of the Hong Kong media in ex-
change for their good will and support((3).
From the perspective of the media owners, cooperating with
China is likely to benefit their (media and non-media) business
interests. Media owners understand that developing guanxi
with the Chinese government is beneficial to their participation
in the market in mainland China. Some of them may also be-
lieve that owning a media organization will enhance their bar-
gaining power when dealing with Chinese officials.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong newspapers have gradually been
taken from the hands of “traditional news people” by profit-
oriented corporations. One of the major acquisitions in re-
cent years was the takeover of the ownership of the Sing
Tao Group by Charles Ho, a tobacco businessman and
CPPCC Standing Committee member. In 2006, PCCW
chairman Richard Li Tzar-kai acquired 50% of the owner-
ship of the Hong Kong Economic Journal from veteran jour-
nalist and famous editorial writer Lam Shan-muk. The case
was widely viewed as signifying the death of the traditional
“intellectual-operated media” in Hong Kong. 
Communication researcher Anthony Fung characterizes the
new media ecology of Hong Kong as a manifestation of non-
organizational concentration((4). The notion of media concen-
tration usually refers to the ownership of the greater number
of media organizations in the hands of a few big players.
However, Hong Kong has been spared the trend of owner-
ship or organizational concentration. Rather, Hong Kong
media ownership has increasingly been taken over by various
pro-China business people who share similar backgrounds
and business interests. Sharon Cheung, a journalist re-
searcher, conducted a content analysis of eleven local news-
papers. She reported that the owners of five of the eleven pa-
pers hold an official appointment in China and enjoy close
ties with the central government. These papers tend to ap-
prove the policies that are issued by the central government
and dilute negative news about the policies. The owners of
four other of the eleven papers have business connections in
mainland China. These four papers seem to be more neutral
in reporting news about China, but they seldom present
strong criticism of the policies of the Chinese government.
Only the two newspapers without any economic or political
affiliation with China do not give the Beijing authorities spe-
cial consideration when reporting news((5).
Re-nationalization applies not only to the political-economic
arena. After the handover, social interactions between Hong
Kong people and mainland Chinese have increased tremen-
dously. New immigrants and visitors from mainland China
come to the city as Hong Kong people head north for work
and leisure. Before 1997, some scholars pointed out that
Hong Kong people had long treated mainland Chinese as
“the other” against which they defined themselves, but this
feeling has faded gradually after the transfer of sovereignty.
Poll findings show that the identification of Hong Kong peo-
ple with China has increased over time((6). In fact, the more
concrete contact that a Hong Kong person has with mainland
China, the more positive are his or her views about China((7). 
Media content reflects these changes. In the past, the Hong
Kong media portrayed China as uncivilized, chaotic, and au-
thoritarian, thereby defining the cultural boundary between
Hong Kong and mainland China. Nowadays, while the co-
opted media tend to depict China positively, even the polit-
ically critical newspaper Apple Daily becomes – intention-
ally or not – the conveyor and promoter of nationalistic sen-
timents, as illustrated by their coverage of the news on the
2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the visits of Chinese
astronauts to Hong Kong.
These cultural and media changes have added new complex-
ities to the phenomenon of media self-censorship. On the
one hand, self-censorship remains a serious problem in the
eyes of professional journalists. In a survey of Hong Kong
journalists conducted in 2006, 29.2% of the respondents re-
ported that self-censorship existed and was “very serious,”
51.9% said self-censorship existed “but was not very seri-
ous,” and only about 3% reported that there was no self-cen-
sorship. The figure of respondents who report serious self-
censorship has in fact doubled from the figure of 14.0% re-
ported in a similar survey in 2001((8). 
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Media and Politics in Hong Kong
On the other hand, the frequent and regular interaction be-
tween Hong Kong journalists and mainland Chinese offi-
cials has led the former to develop a greater identification
with and better understanding of China. Journalists have
thus become less skeptical and more sympathetic towards
the nation. A senior editor of a major newspaper in Hong
Kong opined that the problem of self-censorship is not as se-
rious as most people think, but he admitted that the media
have become more “careful” when commenting on China
due to the media’s better understanding of the country after
years of reporting((9). 
This can be seen as a process of cultural co-orientation,
which refers to the generation of a shared culture and a bet-
ter mutual understanding between two parties through inter-
actions over time. Cultural co-orientation involves changes in
people’s attitudes, judgments, and “common sense.” If self-
censorship concerns journalists who behave against their “in-
dependent judgment” because of political pressure, then
changes in the independent judgment of journalists will alter
what self-censorship encompasses. An originally conscious
act of self-censorship may become naturalized and normal-
ized over time and/or come to be in sync with the new
“common sense.” In the end, when the independent judg-
ment of the majority has changed, those who maintain their
original judgment may be regarded as unprofessional, im-
practical, or simply too radical. 
An example that can best illustrate this point is the coverage
of the Hong Kong media of Taiwan. In the period immedi-
ately after the handover, the issue of Taiwan was highly po-
litically sensitive because Hong Kong and China held differ-
ent attitudes towards the independence of Taiwan. Although
the Hong Kong media have never been supportive of Tai-
wan independence, the topic was largely treated as a legiti-
mate debate. For example, Cable Television interviewed
Taiwan Vice-President Annette Lu in 2000 and used the
norm of journalistic objectivity to defend itself when it was
severely criticized for its reportage by Chinese officials. The
underlying assumption of the behavior of Cable TV was
that the pro-independence opinion deserved a fair hearing in
the public sphere. Yet the Chinese government did not see
national reunification as a legitimate controversy((10). Even
the “objective reporting” of the Taiwan independence view-
point was problematic in the eyes of the Chinese govern-
ment.
Since 2000, however, the Hong Kong media have shut the
door on reporting the pro-independence views of any Tai-
wanese politician. To what extent this is the result of self-
censorship? And to what extent this is a result of the fact
that Hong Kong journalists themselves have turned against
Taiwan independence? It is hard to clearly separate self-cen-
sorship and cultural co-orientation empirically, but the ana-
lytical distinction between the two is crucial to our under-
standing of press freedom in Hong Kong. 
It should be noted that cultural co-orientation is not only a
media phenomenon, but also a social phenomenon. Univer-
sity-conducted opinion polls, for example, have shown that
the percentage of Hong Kong people who are against Tai-
wan independence rose from 58.8% in 1996 to 78.1% in
2006, while the percentage of Hong Kong people who trust
the Chinese government increased from 24.5% to 45.5% in
the same period((11). In any case, the concept of cultural co-
orientation highlights the intricate relationship between cul-
tural changes and press freedom. 
At the time of the handover, people and organizations that
exhibited a tendency to move closer to China were often
criticized as “bending with the wind((12).” Ten years later, in-
tegration with China is treated as an inevitable trend. In the
recent election of the HKSAR Chief Executive, even the
pro-democracy camp candidate Alan Leong had to reiterate
his knowledge of China and experience and ability to com-
municate with mainland China. Re-nationalization involves
both structural changes and cultural changes. “Bending with
the wind” is no longer widely used in public discourse. Self-
censorship is also being redefined.  Hong Kong media  and International  Society
Despite the indomitable forces of re-nationalization, the
Hong Kong media have yet to become identical to their
mainland Chinese counterparts. This is because national
forces are to some extent counterbalanced by international
forces. In fact, Hong Kong has long been in close contact
with the international community.  In the last 30 years of
colonial rule, the colonial government imported Western val-
ues and institutions such as the rule of law, human rights, lib-
erties, and even democracy to Hong Kong. The city’s eco-
nomic system is also acclaimed as one of the most open and
“free” in the world. Many of the said values have been in-
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ternalized by Hong Kong people, who see them as the foun-
dation of Hong Kong’s success. Since 1997, Hong Kong
has been struggling to position itself as a “Chinese city” or
an “international city((13).” The HKSAR government contin-
ues to emphasize the importance of connecting to the world,
and ex-Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa vowed to turn Hong
Kong into “Asia’s World City.” Internationalization is widely
regarded as an effective prescription to enhance the compet-
itiveness of Hong Kong. 
Meanwhile, China has paid greater attention to its international
image. China’s determination to participate in the international
arena is indicated by its membership in the WTO and bid to
host the 2008 Olympics. In addition, to demonstrate the feasi-
bility of the “one country, two systems” formula to Taiwan and
the international community, China cannot overtly act against
the “universal values” of liberty and democracy that are propa-
gated by the Western world. China must take international re-
sponses into account should it ever want to change the course
of its policy towards Hong Kong. 
More specifically, international influence on the Hong Kong
media takes several forms. First, journalistic professionalism is
widely upheld by the Hong Kong media. Hong Kong journal-
ists adopted long ago the liberal model of professional journal-
ism from the West. They regard the media as the “marketplace
of ideas” or “public sphere” and journalists as autonomous ac-
tors who are independent of political and economic power.
They believe in the notions of factual and objective reporting,
and they also believe that the media should play a watchdog
role to monitor the performance of the government and other
power holders on behalf of the general public. Surveys of jour-
nalists in Hong Kong from 1996 to 2006 show that news re-
porters still adhere to these core professional values((14).
The performance of the Hong Kong media during the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003
demonstrated how the media used these international values
to confront China. Whereas the Chinese government block-
aded any news concerning SARS inside mainland China,
scattered information and rumors were widely circulated
among the market-driven Hong Kong media. Later, the out-
break of SARS in Hong Kong triggered an extraordinary
amount of coverage by all members of the local media.
Apple Daily fiercely criticized China for locking up informa-
tion and refusing transparency, and accused mainland Chi-
nese officials of being the culprits responsible for the SARS
outbreak in Hong Kong. Phone-in radio programs in Hong
Kong, especially the highly popular “Tea Cup in a Storm,”
brought firsthand information from frontline medical staff to
the public, and the HKSAR government was accused of try-
ing to deprive the public of its right to information. In China,
the news media were in sync with the central government of-
ficials in reporting on SARS, covering up the spread of the
dreadful disease in the initial stage, whereas in Hong Kong,
the media strictly adhered to the principle of reporting the im-
portant facts to the public. In fact, the connectedness between
Hong Kong and the international community created pressure
on the Chinese government. When global coverage collided
with the official information of the Chinese government, the
government had no choice but to revise its stance. The Min-
ister of Health was dismissed and the central government
started to cooperate with international societies and the World
Health Organization. Finally, it provided factual data to the
WHO and increased transparency in handling the crisis((15).
The case of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong highlights
the connection between the Hong Kong media and foreign
societies. In fact, Hong Kong is where information flow is
speedy and uninhibited, and it serves as an information hub
in Asia in which numerous international media organizations
station their foreign correspondents and news bureaus((16).
About a dozen international newspapers and more than 30
international magazines are registered in Hong Kong. Those
that can be bought on the street include the Financial
Times, The Asian Wall Street Journal, USA Today Inter-
national, the International Herald Tribune, and Nihon
Keizai Shim bun((17). When SARS broke out, news instantly
traveled around infected cities worldwide, prompting compe-
tition among cities and resulting in mutual monitoring. The
reporting of the international media on China, to a certain
degree, may prevent the Hong Kong media from exercising
excessive self-censorship as people with exposure to the in-
ternational media could develop an unfavorable evaluation of
the unprofessional practices of the Hong Kong media. At
the same time, the Chinese coverage by international media
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So (Eds.) (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 322-342.
14. Joseph Chan, “The Global-Local Communication (Dis)Synchronization: Interactions
among Media, Individuals, State and Global Institutions During the SARS Outbreak.”
Paper presented at the conference “Epidemics and Transborder Violence: Communica-
tion and Globalization under a Different Light.” Hong Kong Baptist University, December
17-18, 2004.
15. E. K. W. Ma & J. M. Chan, “Global connectivity and local politics: SARS, talk radio, and
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and H. Siu (Eds.) (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 19-44.
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also enables the Hong Kong media to resort to remediation
as a method of covering sensitive issues on China – “pas-
sively” quoting and reprinting what has been reported in the
international press((18).
Moreover, international authorities have usually been re-
ferred to by Hong Kong journalists as sources of legitimacy
to safeguard press freedom. In a survey of journalists that
was conducted in 2006, more than 60% of the respondents
chose international media organizations as the ideal media
organizations((19). In fact, when facing political pressure in
their work, the Hong Kong media can point to international
journalistic standards for self defense. For example, after the
handover, Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) was re-
peatedly bashed by the pro-China camp, which argued that
it should not criticize the government. In response, RTHK
proclaimed that it is modeled after international (or mainly
European) public broadcasting systems that cherish editorial
independence. At the individual level, international recogni-
tion can also alleviate the pressure that journalists face. A
current affairs program producer acknowledged that interna-
tional awards can help otherwise sensitive programs to avoid
critique from within the news organization((20). In addition, it
is worth noting that even Chinese officials sometimes use in-
ternational instead of mainland Chinese standards when crit-
icizing the Hong Kong media. The most famous example is
the reproach of Hong Kong journalists in 2000 by Jiang
Zemin, China’s former president, in Beijing. He urged
Hong Kong journalists to learn from Mike Wallace of CBS,
rather than asking them to follow any mainland role models. 
In addition to international values and beliefs, other types of
international forces are also important. In the age of media
globalization, expanding business to overseas markets is a
way for media corporations to increase their revenue. For ex-
ample, Ming Pao publishes North American editions in
Vancouver, Toronto, San Francisco, and New York, while
Apple Daily is published in Taiwan. The former has made
good profits in Canada, with a turnover of 0.2 billion Hong
Kong dollars by mid-2006((21). The performance of the latter
continues to thrive, and the circulation of Apple Daily in
Taiwan has recently reached half a million((22). Although we
18. A. S. Y. Cheung, “Hong Kong Press Coverage of China-Taiwan Cross-straits Tension,” In
Hong Kong in Transition, R. Ash, P. Ferdinand, B. Hook, R. Porter, and F. Ash (Eds.) (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2003), pp. 210-225.
19. The survey of journalists was conducted from June to November in 2006. 
20. A personal interview that was conducted in August 2006.
21. “Revenue of MingPao Corporation’s Publishing Business Cut in Half,” Hong Kong Eco-
nomic Journal, (December 18, 2006), p. 22. (In Chinese)
22. “Securities Report-DBS lowers Revenue Prediction on Next Media,” AFX, (February 1,
2007). (In Chinese) 
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should not exaggerate its impact here, investing overseas
may indirectly weaken the influence of China to the extent
that the Chinese market is not the sole consideration of busi-
ness people((23). 
However, while various international forces prevent the
Hong Kong media from falling completely in line with
China, international forces do not always work against China.
For example, the flow of international and China-friendly
capital into the Hong Kong media, represented by the acqui-
sition of the South China Morning Post and Ming Pao by
Malaysian Chinese tycoons Robert Kuok Hock-nien and
Tan Sri Datuk Tiong Hiew King, respectively, is very much
a part of the trend towards non-organization concentration
that was discussed in the previous section. Even transnational
companies such as Yahoo can succumb to the pressure that
is exerted by the Beijing authorities. There is a limit to the
countervailing force that internationalization can bring about.Local  Interes ts  as  the  BottomLine
The media cannot operate effectively in a social vacuum.
The Hong Kong media are located within specific political,
economic, and cultural systems that contribute to their forms
and roles. The members of the Hong Kong media serve a
local audience, and thus their contents and social functions
are inseparable from local interests. The formation of a
“local society” in Hong Kong can be traced back to the mid-
1970s when the Hong Kong economy began to prosper in
tandem with the emergence of the second generation of the
post-war refugees, thereby contributing to the rise of the
Hong Kong identity. Into the 1990s, as Hong Kong under-
went decolonization and democratization, political changes
ignited the expectations of Hong Kong people. The dual
power structure representing the Chinese and British power
centers and the low degree of interference from the colonial
government provided the conditions under which Hong
Kong people articulated their own views, negotiated their
identities, and expressed their hopes and fears.  
Nevertheless, since the handover, the local government is
authorized only by the Chinese government and does not
have high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. In
late 1997, the political reality collided with unfulfilled politi-
cal expectations and coincided with the Asian financial tur-
moil. In the following years, as the economic decline has con-
tinued and social crises have recurred, social grievances have
accumulated. Some media outlets have taken advantage of
weak governance and grown in popularity. They have used po-
litical criticism as their selling point, and they position them-
selves as the guardians of local and public interests (as op-
posed to the interests of the government and business peo-
ple). A populist and confrontational media, spearheaded by
Apple Daily and a number of critical talk radio programs,
have been cultivated. They serve as channels for the expres-
sion of public discontent, while at the same time reinforcing
such discontent((24). After the highly controversial national se-
curity legislation debate and the SARS outbreak in early
2003, the accumulation of grievances finally led to the July 1
demonstration in 2003, in which 500,000 people marched on
the street to vent their anger at the HKSAR administration.
Against this background, Joseph Chan and Clement So have
argued that on local matters, the Hong Kong media have
served a “surrogate democracy function” in Hong Kong.
Within the context of the underdevelopment of democracy in
Hong Kong, the media fill in the gap and have become the
most important platform for public opinion formation and ex-
pression. Besides allowing people to voice their opinions, the
media also promote communication between officials and cit-
izens, criticize the government, and promote social reform((25).
The surrogate democracy function supplements the lack of
democracy in the formal political institutions and contributes
to social stability in post-handover Hong Kong.
The close relationship between local interests and the media
can best be illustrated through the aforementioned case of
the July 1 demonstration in 2003. After the historic protest,
some Chinese officials pinpointed Apple Daily and several
radio phone-in programs as the major mobilizers behind the
event. Indeed, Apple Daily adopted the advocacy approach
to the extent that it printed the headline “See You in the
Streets” on its front page on the day of the demonstration.
Putting aside whether Apple Daily and the radio phone-in
programs really had huge mobilization power, arguably all of
the Hong Kong media played an important role in facilitating
54 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
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Media and Politics in Hong Kong
the formation of the protest. First, the tremendous amount of
coverage of the national security legislation debate and the up-
coming demonstration helped set the public agenda. Second,
the media reported the calls for action made by social elites
and political groups, thus broadcasting the messages by lead-
ers such as the Catholic Bishop Joseph Zen and the Hong
Kong Professional Teachers’ Union. This reportage also cer-
tified and legitimized the demonstration. Third, the media
were crucial in transmitting “action-facilitating information” to
readers and listeners and assisting their participation((26).
But it would be wrong to say that the public simply followed the
lead of the media. The powerful expression of public opinion
through the July 1 demonstration also called for responses from
the media. Most notably, after the protest, different media out-
lets overwhelmingly used positive words such as “rational” and
“peaceful” to describe and eulogize the rally. Facing what we
called energized public opinion, the media felt pressure to side
with the public. Newspapers that espoused different political
stances converged in their portrayal of the protest and discus-
sions of its implications. Although this convergence was by no
means complete, political parallelism in Hong Kong did dimin-
ish for a period of time. When political parallelism re-emerged,
the configuration of discourses had already changed((27). The
case of the July 1 demonstration in 2003 shows that the Hong
Kong media, riding on the wave of re-nationalization, had to ad-
just in the face of the powerful expression of local opinions in
the form of collective action. At the same time, those media
that attempt to struggle against re-nationalization can treat pub-
lic opinion as their capital and resource.  
Nevertheless, local opinions and interests do not necessarily
contradict re-nationalization, because Hong Kong and
China do not stand on opposite sides on every issue. More-
over, while re-nationalization largely implies a move towards
more conservative political values in the context of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong society and culture themselves also have
a fair share of conservatism. For example, Hong Kong has
little tolerance towards “radical” behavior. More precisely,
many acts that are regarded as “normal” and commonplace in
social struggles in other countries are often treated as “too rad-
ical” in Hong Kong. “Law and order” and “rationalism and
pragmatism” form part of the deep-rooted cultural codes of
Hong Kong society. Therefore, the symbolic resistance of so-
cial movement activists against established institutions can
hardly win the support of the media. Acts of civil disobedience
may receive sympathy or even support from the media during
the early stages of an event, but as the event unfolds, the media
often return to the baseline of “order” or “rationalism((28).” 
This means that the performance and future development of
the Hong Kong media is also partly dependent on the future
development of the local political culture.Media  Poli t ics  as  the  Interp layof  the  Three  Forces
As stated previously, media politics in post-handover Hong
Kong can be understood as the interplay among the forces
of re-nationalization, internationalization, and localization.
Since 1997, the HKSAR government has had to toe the
line of the central government on important issues. How-
ever, when there are serious conflicts between the central
and the local governments, the HKSAR government has to
address the demands of the Hong Kong people. China can-
not frequently and overtly intervene in Hong Kong affairs
because of its concern over its profession of “one country,
two systems.” As reflected in the performance of the media,
the power transition has indeed induced scruples on the part
of the media in reporting certain issues. Some media outlets
have allied themselves with the new power center. However,
market considerations remain important to the commercial
media in Hong Kong, and many journalists still adhere to
professional values and norms. Coupled with international
concerns regarding press freedom in Hong Kong, the Hong
Kong media have yet to become fully submissive. 
Self-censorship has been one of the responses of the media
to political pressure. However, under the twin considerations
of market competition and professionalism, some members
of the media have come up with a set of strategies to manage
political pressure and professional credibility at the same
time. These include the increasing use of juxtapositions be-
tween positive and negative opinions towards the power hold-
ers, the increasing use of polls as “objective” indicators of
public opinion, the increasing use of non-political authorities
(such as academics) as commentators, and the adoption of
rhetorical strategies to produce “rational and objective” edito-
rials((29). With these techniques, “professionalism” becomes a
weapon for self-defense when the media are criticized.
55N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
27. J. M. Chan & F. L. F. Lee, “Energized Public Opinion and Media’s Political Parallelism: A Case
Study of the 1 July 2003 Rally in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, No. 31
Autumn/Winter (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2006), pp. 71-95.  (In Chinese) 
28. A. Ku, “Constructing and Contesting the ‘Order’ Imagery in Media Discourse – Implications
for Civil Society in Hong Kong,” Asian Journal of Communication, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June
2007), pp. 186-200; F. L. F. Lee, “Election Interpretations, Post-election Campaign, and In-
stitutional Repair: The Case of the 2004 Legislature Council Elections in Hong Kong,” The
Chinese Journal of Communication and Society, No. 1 (2006), pp. 69-90. (In Chinese)
29. See note 10 above, and also C. C. Lee, “The Paradox of Political Economy: Media Struc-
ture, Press Freedom, and Regime Change in Hong Kong,” In Power, Money, and Media,
C. C. Lee (Ed.) (Illinois: Northwestern University Press), pp. 288-336. 
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
In other words, objective journalism can be a helpful tool
in resisting political pressure in Hong Kong. However, the
emphasis on “objectivity” has at the same time hampered
the function of the press as the fourth estate. For example,
in a study of how the editorials of two newspapers re-
sponded to the democratic reform debate in 2004, it was
discovered that Ming Pao, a paper that proclaims its pro-
fessionalism and credibility, positioned itself as a neutral
commentator situated between the democratic camp and
the Chinese government. It also repeatedly advocated ra-
tional discussion in its editorials((30). However, this stance
of neutrality and rationality proved feeble as the paper did
not publish any strong critiques of China when China uni-
laterally vetoed universal suffrage for Hong Kong in 2007-
2008. 
More broadly speaking, the media’s show of neutrality when
the public is expecting a strong critique of the government
on certain issues is likely to be perceived as a form of self-
censorship. A survey that was conducted in 2006 showed
that close to half of Hong Kong people said that the media
should side with Hong Kong when there is a clash of inter-
ests between China and Hong Kong. These people are also
more inclined to say the media have practiced self-censor-
ship on controversial issues between China and Hong
Kong((31). These findings show that on controversial issues
which involve conflicts between China and Hong Kong,
“objectivity and neutrality” cannot satisfy the majority of the
public. In the foreseeable future, issues that are caused by
China-Hong Kong conflict will pose a great challenge to the
Hong Kong media.
Nonetheless, we are not completely pessimistic about the sit-
uation of the Hong Kong media. In fact, after the handover,
even in times during which overt political pressure was ap-
plied (e.g., through public criticisms by central government
officials), the Hong Kong press still stood firm and stressed
the principle of press freedom and journalistic professional-
ism((32). With regard to the problem of self-censorship, the
Hong Kong Journalists Association called for members in
the field to retain their professional standards((33). As noted
above, Hong Kong journalists adopted long ago Western
professional journalistic practices, and view the media as in-
dependent gatekeepers for monitoring the government’s per-
formance. Press freedom is a universally recognized value –
even the Chinese government cannot deny or overtly in-
fringe upon it. The open and free media system in Hong
Kong remains more or less intact structurally. It can be said
that, as a professional norm and a symbol in public dis-
course, professionalism is the most powerful weapon of the
Hong Kong media. The problem lies only in how “profes-
sional” journalism is practiced.  
Meanwhile, economic forces work both for and against po-
litical influences. Capitalists have the tendency to be co-
opted by the political power center. Media market forces,
however, can serve to restrain the media from getting too
close to the power center too fast. Media outlets that com-
pletely disregard professionalism and independence will
likely be shunned by the public. Apple Daily captures a spe-
cific niche market by taking a critical stance against the
HKSAR and Chinese governments, and hence has become
one of the most popular local newspapers. If other competi-
tors want to secure a share in the local market, they cannot
afford to deviate too far from local interests. The existence
of Apply Daily also serves as a buffer for other media, be-
cause as long as their viewpoints are less critical than the
viewpoint of Apple Daily, political pressure on them is alle-
viated. The commercial success of Apple Daily illustrates
that its market-led advocacy journalism and the intensified
objective journalism that is practiced by other media can
cover each other politically.  
Although Hong Kong has returned to China, it retains its in-
ternational status. Numerous foreign news agencies are based
in Hong Kong, and the free flow of information in Hong
Kong makes it difficult to restrict the news system in Hong
Kong.  With the scheme of “one country, two systems” en-
shrined in the Basic Law, the constitutional document of
Hong Kong, the HKSAR government and the Beijing au-
thorities are held accountable for maintaining press freedom
in Hong Kong. As Chinese society becomes more pluralistic
and as China further integrates with Hong Kong and the rest
of the world, the pressure on China to comply with interna-
tional standards of openness and transparency will increase.
However, this will take time to take effect. In the last analysis,
press freedom in Hong Kong is subject to the interplay among
the forces of re-nationalization, internationalization, and local-
ization. The key to press freedom in Hong Kong lies in the
extent to which Hong Kong and China are democraticized. •
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